Judicial Ethics: The Less-Often Asked Questions by Kaufman, Andrew L.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 64 Number 4 
10-1-1989 
Judicial Ethics: The Less-Often Asked Questions 
Andrew L. Kaufman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Judges Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew L. Kaufman, Judicial Ethics: The Less-Often Asked Questions, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 851 (1989). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol64/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 1989 by Washington Law Review Association
JUDICIAL ETHICS: THE LESS-OFTEN
ASKED QUESTIONS
Andrew L. Kaufman*
Abstract: Judicial ethics is a topic of increasing interest to the public, the bar, and the
judiciary; only recently has the body of substantive law regarding judicial behavior begun
to take shape. This essay explores the less developed issues of exparte communication by
judges, activities of judges' spouses, the obligation of judges to report attorney disciplinary
violations, and extrajudicial comments by judges about legal matters. The Author ana-
lyzes the positions on these issues of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, the Judicial
Conference of the United States' Code of Conduct for United States Judges, and the Dis-
cussion Draft of Draft Revisions to the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, and offers his own
view of the appropriate standards for each.
Editor's Note: An earlier version of the following essay was deliv-
ered as a talk at the Spring Symposium of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held at Blaine, Washington, on April
21 and 23, 1988. The topics discussed were based upon questions
regarding judicial ethics submitted to the author by individual Ninth
Circuit judges. The talk generated a lively exchange of ideas at the
symposium, ideas that have been incorporated into the essay that
appears below. Although the author refers primarily to federal appel-
late judges, the essay is equally relevant to state appellate judges and
to federal and state trial judges.
I have selected from the menu of questions concerning judicial eth-
ics the ones that have not been much discussed but that seem to me to
be highly relevant for federal appellate judges and, indeed, for all
judges. I have therefore ignored much-discussed questions relating to
disqualification and financial interests of judges.'
My topics are the following: ex parte communication by judges with
others about pending or impending matters; permissible activities of
judges' spouses; the obligation of judges to report disciplinary viola-
tions by lawyers to the appropriate disciplinary authorities; and extra-
judicial comments by judges about legal matters.
* Charles Stebbins Fairchild Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. The Author wishes to
express his appreciation to the judges of the Ninth Circuit and their spouses for the gracious
hospitality extended to the author and his wife and for the impressive spirit of collegiality
displayed throughout the four-day symposium.
1. See Lubet, Regulation ofJudges'Business and Financial,4ctivities, 37 EMORY L.J. I (1988);
Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35
CASE W.L. RE. 662 (1985).
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I. THE GROWING FIELD OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
When I first began teaching the subject of professional responsibility
over 20 years ago, the subject of judicial ethics was of little concern,
either to judges, academics, the profession generally, or even to those
special critics, the newspapers. There were occasional episodes that
produced comment-a public squabble between Justices Jackson and
Black over the propriety of Justice Black sitting in a case argued by his
former law partner,2 or Justice Roberts serving as a member of the
Pearl Harbor Commission,3 or the charges of bribery against Judge
Manton of the Second Circuit and Judge Davis of the Third Circuit 4-
but they were noteworthy because they were so occasional. Most
judges, like most lawyers, appeared to believe they had their ethics
well in hand.
Things are quite different today. Questions of judicial ethics have
followed questions of professional ethics generally in becoming a sta-
ple of professional life. There is, however, one major difference
between lawyers' ethics and judges' ethics. There is a substantial
amount of substantive law relating to the former, and the possibility of
sanctions for violation of that law has become quite real. Not only are
there motions to disqualify lawyers from the representation of clients
but there is also an increasing possibility of professional discipline,
malpractice suits by clients, or even suits by third parties. A lawyer's
ethics also may come under scrutiny in the event of appointment to
public office, especially judicial office.
The same extensive body of sanctions does not exist with respect to
judicial conduct. Occasionally, judges are disqualified from sitting in
particular cases; less frequently, judges are disciplined or even
removed from the bench; and rarely, judicial behavior is questioned in
a confirmation hearing when a judge is promoted. Nevertheless, in
recent years, especially since the adoption of the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges and the Code of Judicial Conduct for state
judges,5 a body of case law and advisory opinions has developed suffi-
ciently to delineate a body of substantive law of judicial ethics. One
2. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 640-645 (1956).
3. Id. at 707.
4. J. BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 23-82 (1962); S. PRESSER, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT 171 (1982).
5. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges was adopted in 1973 by the Judicial
Conference of the United States and applies to all federal judges except Supreme Court Justices.
It is nearly identical to the Code of Judicial Conduct, which was prepared by the American Bar
Association. See Comment, Protecting the Appearance of Judicial Impartiality in the Face ofLaw
Clerk Employment Negotiations, 62 WASH. L. REV. 813, 816 n.29 (1987). The latter has been
adopted, albeit with some modifications, by all states and the District of Columbia except
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possible explanation for the development of this substantive law is that
lawyers have begun to use motions to disqualify judges in the same
way that they sometimes use motions to disqualify opposing counsel:
as matters of strategy to disqualify someone perceived to be unsympa-
thetic to the client's cause.6 While there may be some truth to that
observation, I think that it is not a major reason for the growing
importance of the subjebt of judicial ethics.
A more persuasive explanation sees development in the field of judi-
cial ethics as part of the ever-increasing focus in our society upon the
conduct of our public officials. Watergate certainly ushered in a new
era, one that shows little sign of waning. To be in public life is to live
under a microscope. Although judicial business is shielded in part by
the confidentiality of court proceedings, that has not protected judges
completely from the scrutiny that must be endured by other public
officials. Indeed, the very confidentiality that judges enjoy has seemed
to some to justify, even to require, greater scrutiny of their conduct to
assure or to ascertain the purity of the process.
There is yet a third explanation that needs to be explored. Although
interest in how law is made has waxed and waned at various times in
the history of Anglo-American law, judges and students of law have
known for a very long time that there is an element of policymaking
that necessarily inheres in judicial decisionmaking. The extent of poli-
cymaking has been a subject of debate, but rhetoric and polemic aside,
the necessity for judges to exercise some kind of judgment has been
generally accepted and recognized. The Legal Realists of the 1920s
and 1930s highlighted this insight and sought to raise it to a higher
degree of consciousness both in judges and the public generally. Inso-
far as the public was concerned, however, they did not succeed very
notably.
In most recent years, however, a judiciary that has been increasingly
and more noticeably activist and creative-and not just in constitu-
tional law matters-has caused more attention to be focused on
judges. The attention has been heightened by the very public efforts of
academic legal theorists. Both those who have urged the importance
of economic models in shaping law and those who, coming from a very
Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Lubet, Professor Polonius Advises Judge Laertes: Rules,
Good Taste and the Scope of Public Comment, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 665, 673 n.42 (1989). A
committee of the American Bar Association is working on a revision of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and has produced a Discussion Draft, dated May 1, 1989 (hereinafter ABA Discussion
Draft).
6. See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 869
F.2d 116 (1989) (where the problem is discussed).
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different direction, have described judicial decisionmaking as charac-
terized by extreme indeterminacy of principle and by extreme manipu-
lability of result have portrayed judges as possessed of power to shape
law more or less (and mostly more) in terms of personal preference.
One fallout from these views of judicial decisionmaking has been an
increase in concern about the ethics of those who are perceived as pos-
sessing such enormous power.
Indeed, the basic rule of the Code of Conduct, the one to which all
other rules are mere commentary, reflects this concern: judges should
avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety in
all things relating to their office.7 A similar canon appeared in the
older Model Code of Professional Responsibility governing lawyers'
conduct, and many courts still rely heavily on that notion in assessing
the propriety of particular conduct.8 In analyzing the use of that
notion, I usually tell my students that most of the time the phrase
"appearance of impropriety" is a substitute for thought and close anal-
ysis. In most cases, what is usually at stake is a lawyer's responsibility
to a particular person, and a court ought to be able to supply a more
specific reason for disapproving lawyers' conduct than something
called the appearance of impropriety. The only exception I make is
when the lawyer is a public lawyer. There, appearances do count,
because one responsibility of government lawyers is to the citizenry at
large. In that situation, it is permissible to talk of an appearance of
impropriety so long as we are told why the mythical "reasonable per-
son" ought to be concerned about the lawyer's conduct.
The same justification for talking about an appearance of impropri-
ety exists when the conduct is that of a judge. Judges owe responsibili-
ties to a wider circle than just the parties and their counsel in the
particular case being decided. What we call "the public" ought to be
concerned that every case be, and be seen to be, fairly decided. That is
the basis not only of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges,9
but also of 28 U.S.C. section 455(a), which prescribes disqualification
in any case in which the impartiality of a judge "might reasonably be
questioned." The key of course is the word "reasonably," which pro-
vides very little guidance in any particular case. As with other bodies
7. Canon 2 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is headed: "A Judge Should
Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge's Activities."
8. Canon 9 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which is still in force in a
significant minority of states, is headed: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of
Impropriety." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981), reprinted in
T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, 1988 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
66 (1988).
9. See supra note 5.
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of law where a similar concept obtains, however, the slow process of
case-by-case adjudication in courts and advisory committees has
begun to build a body of substantive law.
For federal judges, a major source of substantive law is found in the
body of advisory opinions promulgated by the Committee on Codes of
Conduct ("Advisory Committee"), a committee of federal judges
appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States at the request of
the Judicial Conference. Its principal task is to give advice to federal
judges on matters of judicial ethics. It does so by means of published
and unpublished Advisory Opinions."0 There are 82 Advisory Opin-
ions at last count, and Opinion 62 summarizes all the Advisory Opin-
ions, including many unpublished Opinions, between 1970 and mid-
1979 that deal with disqualification and with participation in non-judi-
cial activities. An amazing variety of subject matter has been covered
by the Advisory Committee. Moreover, since the earlier work of the
ABA provided the basis for the federal Code of Conduct that was
approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States, no judge
should neglect to keep abreast of the work of the ABA Committee that
is currently revising the Code of Judicial Conduct.1" It is no longer
true that one can say, "I am ethical; I don't need to concern myself
with what the committee is doing." The ABA committee will doubt-
less be considering matters that lie fairly close to the daily routine of
judges' work. It is not too strong to say that judges who ignore that
Committee's activities will do so at their peril.
II. EX PARTE COMMUNICATION
The issue with respect to ex parte communication involves the per-
missible range of consultation by judges on the merits, or on proce-
dures affecting the merits, of pending matters with others: law
teachers; judges of other courts, including state courts; and judges of
one's own court. The Code of Conduct tells judges not to initiate or
consider ex parte communication, except as authorized by law. 2 The
10. The "published" Advisory Opinions were circulated to federal judges but they have only
recently been made public. They are available from the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts but have not otherwise been published.
11. See supra note 5.
12. See supra note 5. Canon 3(A)(4) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
provides:
A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or the
person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law,
neither initiate nor consider ex-parte or other communications concerning a pending or
impending proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on
the law applicable to a proceeding before the judge if the judge gives notice to the parties of
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Commentary to the Canon is quite explicit that the prohibition
includes law teachers and excludes other judges and court personnel
whose function is to assist judges in their decisionmaking.
Eighteen years ago as a member of a committee designed to assess
the ABA's Code of Judicial Conduct, I fought the prohibition against
consultation with law teachers on the ground that, given the pressure
on judges, they were entitled to whatever assistance they could get
from academics.1 3 Since then, I have changed my mind about the
desirability of permitting such consultation for three reasons. Quick,
offhand advice from law teachers, who may appear to be more
informed about a precise question than they really are, is much too
casual. Moreover, it is given without the responsible frame of mind
that comes from having to cast a vote. Furthermore, so many law
teachers are now engaged in outside activities, either for profit or in a
nonprofit but partisan fashion, that their advice may well be affected
by quite specific interest in ways that will not be known to an inquiring
judge. I would therefore leave the prohibition in place. Indeed, I
would do more than that. I would make the prohibition even more
explicit, because I am continuously surprised at how often it is vio-
lated by federal and state judges alike, either directly or via their law
clerks. 14
Ex parte communication with other judges is another matter. The
purpose of the prohibition is to make sure that parties who appear
before a judge have access to the relevant materials on which a judge
may rely. Despite the language in the Commentary to Canon 3(A)(4)
that judges are not precluded from talking with other judges, I simply
cannot believe that can be taken literally. In his published notes, Pro-
fessor Thode, the Reporter for the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct,
states that this exception was recognized as falling within the "author-
ized by law" language of the Code. 5 But despite Professor Thode's
comments, it can hardly be "authorized by law" for a federal judge to
talk about a pending matter with a state court judge. There is a formal
the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable
opportunity to respond.
13. Weckstein, Introductory Observations on the Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 785, 788 (1972) (summarizing my views).
14. I am referring here to explicit conversation about the merits of specific cases, not general
inquiries for bibliographic assistance with respect to general subject areas. As to the latter, I
think no general statements of approval or disapproval may be made. Some inquiries may be so
general as to raise no question; others may be so specific as to fall clearly within the rules.
15. E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 53 (1973). The
provisions of Canon 3(A)(4) of the ABA's Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct
for United States Judges are identical.
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procedure for certification of questions when a federal judge needs
advice about matters of state law. That procedure avoids the too-cas-
ual giving of an opinion that is one problem when talking with a judge
of another jurisdiction. Moreover, is it "authorized by law" for judges
to talk with judges on potential reviewing courts-for a federal district
judge in California, for example, to talk with a Ninth Circuit judge? I
would think not, even though we know that this was occasionally done
even by Supreme Court justices in the nineteenth century.16 Such con-
sultation has something of the flavor of obtaining an advisory opinion.
Likewise, it seems difficult to conceive of a discussion between a dis-
trict judge in California and a United States Court of Appeals judge in
New York as coming within the notion of "authorized by law" when
the jurisdiction of the two judges is not coextensive.
In my view, the hardest questions relate to federal judges consulting
with other federal judges on the same court. A narrow view might
well restrict judges to talking only with other judges who have some
responsibility with respect to the pending matter, that is, members of
the panel to whom the case is assigned. The only case I am aware of
that has discussed the matter takes a different view. In People v. Her-
nandez, 17 a sentencing judge in California to whom a particular case
had been cited consulted with the sentencing judge in the cited case
about the circumstances of that case and about that judge's under-
standing of the meaning of the reviewing court's opinion. The Court
of Appeals treated this consultation as entirely proper. Interestingly,
the court did not simply say that consultation between the judges of
the same court, the Superior Court of California, was always permissi-
ble. Its grounds were narrower. It took note of the tremendous time
and caseload pressure placed on trial judges and stated that the discus-
sion that occurred was well within the bounds of public expectation of
judicial conduct. While the appellate court did not explicitly equate its
perception of public expectation with what is "authorized by law," it
seemed to do so implicitly. The California court's resolution of the
problem is a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting policies, but
a more restrictive approach also would be a reasonable assurance that
the judge with responsibility is the one deciding the matter.
If Canon 3(A)(4) is to be understood as limiting discussion to mem-
bers of the same court, federal judges must still decide whether
16. See, ag., the correspondence between Justice Bradley and then-Judge Woods as set forth
in 7 FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION
AND REUNION, 1864-68, 186-93 (Part 2 1987), especially 186 n.4, which contains references to
other instances of such communication.
17. 160 Cal. App. 3d 725, 206 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1984).
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"court" should be viewed geographically or hierarchically. Are all
Court of Appeals judges members of the same court, or are only Ninth
Circuit judges members of the same court? I would draw the line
where the demands of cooperation and collegiality seem the greatest,
namely geographically. The theory of the Canon is that judges with
the power to decide cases should make up their own minds and not
engage in secret consultations, at least not outside the deciding court
to which the parties have no access.
I also was asked about the ethical propriety of an appellate judge
discussing a case with less than the entire panel of appellate judges,
especially in en banc cases. In extreme situations, as in the United
States Supreme Court in the 1930s, such discussions might even
develop into defined caucuses meeting in advance of court confer-
ences.18 While a pre-conference caucus by part of a court seems to
defeat the very idea of a collegial process of decisionmaking, no formal
code of ethics with which I am familiar has even addressed the prob-
lem. Nor do I perceive any realistic way in which it could. It seems
almost unthinkable to prevent two judges with chambers side by side
in one city from talking about an en banc matter unless their col-
leagues, who are scattered over 1500 miles, are all brought together.
Drafting a rule that permits such discussions but prohibits "caucus"
discussions seems impractical, if not impossible. Preventing or reme-
dying the breakdown of collegiality that leads to formation of caucuses
seems the only practical solution, and that will not always be
successful.
While I am on the topic of ex parte communication, I have found
myself wondering lately about the practice of judges sitting on law
school moot court cases involving matters that either are actually
pending in their courts or are, to everyone's knowledge, wending their
way through the judicial system toward their courts. Such cases are
the staple of the higher moot court rounds that judges are often asked
to judge. Is it enough that the judge refrain from announcing a deci-
sion on the merits? I think not. Canon 3(A)(4) is directed against
''communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding."
The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
advised that this same Canon prohibits a judge from asking for
research help from a criminal law research project of a law school
unless the judge complies with the provisions of the rule requiring
18. See Rauh, A Personal View of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo: Recollections of Four Cardozo




notice to the parties, a summary of the advice received, and an oppor-
tunity to respond. 9 The briefs and arguments in a moot court case
are rather similar and seem to come within the letter and spirit of the
rule. The same problem also may occur when judges who are also law
teachers invite class discussion of cases pending before them. 0
III. ACTIVITIES OF JUDGES' SPOUSES
Another matter about which I was asked relates to the obligations
put on judges by reason of the activities of their spouses. A major
question relates to political activity by a spouse. The federal Advisory
Committee has struggled with the difficult question of trying to
accommodate its advice to the judge with the legal rights of the spouse
in an age where an active life by both spouses outside the home is
becoming increasingly common. The shift in position on this point is
an interesting sociological commentary on our times.
Canon 7 of the Code of Conduct prohibits a judge from engaging in
political activity except for activities relating to improvement of the
law, the legal system, and the administration of justice. The Canon,
however, refers only to the conduct of judges, not their spouses. Nev-
ertheless, the Advisory Committee in 1977 went beyond Canon 7's
specific injunction to state more generally, without any discussion,
that although spouses have the legal right to hold office in a political
organization and take part in its activities, the judge has the duty to
try to dissuade the spouse from doing so.2" The Advisory Committee
went even further in the very same Opinion in the following extraordi-
nary statement:
The spouses of many judges have concluded that the provisions of the
Code should apply to them the same as to the judge. Thus, they refrain
not only from political activity but from solicitation of funds for chari-
ties and churches and from public comment about matters pending
before the spouse, to mention but a few of the prohibitions on judges.
Many spouses have regarded the applying to them of the ban on solicita-
tion of funds as a 'fringe benefit' which they welcomed. Each spouse has
the right to reach his or her own conclusion as to such activity.22
19. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1346 (1975).
20. Canon 3A(4) has been revised somewhat in the ABA Discussion Draft and renumbered
as Canon 3B(6). It does not address the problems mentioned in this essay except that the
Commentary does require judges to make reasonable efforts to ensure compliance by law clerks
and other personnel with Canon 3B(6).
21. Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities Op. 53 (1977).
22. Id
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The Committee did not formally adopt this observation as its own
advice because it has no authority to impose obligations on spouses. It
seems clear, however, that it was not simply making an irrelevant
observation; it was holding up its factual observation as a model of
good behavior. If my inference is accurate, the Committee went too
far. Its authority is to advise those over whom it has jurisdiction.
That does not include spouses. If there is to be some regulation of
spouses' conduct, it should come from a body with that power.
It would appear that the Committee now agrees. In 1983, it issued a
revised opinion that simply states that the canons themselves ade-
quately define the judge's obligation when the spouse engages in polit-
ical activity and that the committee does not advise spouses.2 3 It
added that judges should, as far as possible, disassociate themselves
from their spouses' political activity, and it gave some examples of
how that might be accomplished. It also pointed out that the judge
should make the spouse aware that involvement in politics will
increase the number of times when the judge will be obliged to recuse.
While the Committee did not state the reasons for issuing a revised
opinion or specifically disavow any statements in the earlier opinion,
the most plausible explanation is that it came to view its indirect
attempt to limit spouses' activities as inappropriate. I assume that the
same approach would apply to any other, nonpolitical activities of a
spouse. Spouses may do what they wish. Spouses' political activity
may sometimes lead judges to disqualify themselves in particular mat-
ters, but that is a problem that should be left to the spouses to resolve
between themselves.24
IV. JUDICIAL OBLIGATION TO REPORT DISCIPLINARY
VIOLATIONS
The next question is a very serious one for federal judges, although
it does not arise so frequently for Courts of Appeals judges as it does
for district and bankruptcy court judges. It concerns the obligation of
judges to report violations of the Code of Conduct. That is one issue
on which the Code gives explicit advice. Canon 3(B)(3) states that "a
judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against
23. Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct Revised Advisory Op. 53 (1983).
24. See In re Gaulkin, 69 N.J. 185, 351 A.2d 740 (1976), in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court reviewed the whole subject and relaxed its former prohibition barring a judge's spouse
from engaging in political activity. The Commentary to Canon 5B(1)(a) of the ABA Discussion
Draft states: "Although a judicial candidate must encourage members of his or her family to
adhere to the same standards of political conduct in support of the candidate that apply to the
candidate, family members are free to participate in other political activity."
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a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may
become aware."25 There are no qualifications, except for the use of the
word "should" instead of "shall." I confess that I do not quite under-
stand the distinction in the judges' Code of Conduct. In the lawyer's
disciplinary rules,26 the words are used to differentiate mandatory
rules, whose violation may be sanctioned, from hortatory or aspira-
tional rules, whose violation may not. But since there are no sanctions
directly linked to the judges' Code of Conduct-although there is the
possibility of disqualification or discipline-the difference between
"should" canons and "shall" canons is not entirely clear. But it also is
true that since the possibilities of anything that might be called sanc-
tions are so small, that simply increases the obligation on judges to
abide by their own self-made rules of conduct.
I start with an observation that I believe to be true but that I cannot
prove: federal and state judges, appellate and trial, do not often take or
initiate disciplinary measures against lawyers, although recently
instances of reporting seem to be increasing. The question is to
explain the reluctance of judges to do so. It must be that trial judges
and, occasionally, appellate judges see conduct that constitutes a seri-
ous violation of the disciplinary rules: lawyers who knowingly conceal
from the court precedents that are directly on point; lawyers who
knowingly make a false statement of law or fact to the court or engage
in conduct that involves dishonesty, misrepresentation, deceit or
fraud; and lawyers who engage in illegal conduct involving moral tur-
pitude before the court.
I can only speculate about the reasons that lead courts to pay very
little attention to Canon 3(B)(3). Courts are very busy. Focusing on
violations by lawyers puts an additional burden on the judicial system,
is expensive, and deflects attention from the main business of adjudi-
cating the rights and liabilities of the litigants. Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure itself has been criticized on those grounds,
and the time may not be right to add yet another side issue, another
tactic, to distract the court.
There also may be another reason. Judges are lawyers and they may
succumb to the same anti-snitch sentiment that has largely nullified
the similar obligation to report violations that exists for lawyers in
most jurisdictions. There is, however, a big difference between lawyers
25. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 3(3)(3).
26. The reference is to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which provide the basis for most of the substantive law of professional
responsibility in this country.
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and judges in this regard. In reporting disciplinary violations by law-
yers, judges would be enforcing the rules for which they themselves
are responsible. By and large, courts have been jealous of their power
to regulate the conduct of lawyers in this country and have been
unwilling to cede this responsibility to legislatures or to administrative
bodies. Courts should not be able to have it both ways. If they are
going to maintain responsibility for rules of conduct and their enforce-
ment, then they should be taking the lead in enforcement with respect
to violations that occur in front of them. Lawyers can shield them-
selves to a large extent by taking refuge in the comfort that they do not
"know" that a violation has occurred in most cases. Judges should
not draw the line so finely with respect to their own rules. They
should forward matters for investigation when there is an apparent
violation even if they are not absolutely certain and do not have the
time or the resources to make a crucial finding of fact.
All this seems apparent simply by reason of the court's rule making
power. But the Judicial Conference has imposed an ethical duty on
judges in Canon 3(B)(3) to report disciplinary violations of which they
become aware. At least in those cases, judges have no excuse for
silence. One final reason for such silence that I have not touched upon
is that these matters are not high in judges' minds. My purpose in
discussing the matter is to raise awareness about this issue.
It is true that the policy and wording of Canon 3(B)(3) raise some
problems. The Canon imposes an obligation whenever the judge
"becomes aware" of a disciplinary violation. The contrasting provi-
sion in the lawyers' professional code imposes an obligation whenever
a lawyer has information "clearly establishing" a violation of the disci-
plinary rules. The different wording justifies an interpretation impos-
ing an obligation on judges whenever a serious question arises in their
minds that a violation has occurred. I would not interpret the Canon
to make it identical to the very restrictive wording that permits law-
yers to avoid a reporting obligation because they are not certain that a
violation has occurred.
For one thing, judges ought not to be required to interrupt the busi-
ness of adjudicating disputes to make the requisite findings of fact
regarding disciplinary violations by lawyers when the underlying facts
are unclear. Federal judges, especially, may wish to refer such matters
to state disciplinary authorities. States are the primary licensing
authority. Except where federal courts have adopted their own rules,
state law is generally the primary source of the law of professional




federal courts to refer disciplinary matters to the state disciplinary
machinery.
This discussion, however, ought to give federal courts some pause
with respect to the substantive law of professional responsibility that
they apply. In situations where the district court has not by local rule
explicitly adopted a state's professional responsibility code as its own,
federal courts have tended to follow the most recent code promulgated
by the American Bar Association as "a guide." A federal court that
follows that route loses one justification for referring a disciplinary
matter to the state authorities. A state with a different body of profes-
sional responsibility law (usually the older Model Code but perhaps an
amended version of the Model Rules) may be reluctant to adjudicate
discipline under an unfamiliar body of substantive law.
The ABA Discussion Draft clarifies the judge's obligation but, in
my view, it has taken a step in the wrong direction. It provides in
Canon 3D:
(1) A judge having knowledge that another judge has committed a
violation of this Code should take appropriate action and, if the viola-
tion raises a substantial question as to the other judge's fitness for office,
shall inform the appropriate authority.
(2) A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a viola-
tion of the Rules of Professional Conduct [substitute correct title if the
applicable rules of lawyer conduct have a different title] should take
appropriate action and, if the violation raises a substantial question as to
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects, shall inform the appropriate authority.
(3) Acts of a judge in the discharge of disciplinary responsibilities
imposed by this section 3D shall be absolutely privileged, and no civil
action predicated thereon may be instituted against ihe judge. Note:
The rule was changed specifically to require judges to report to a disci-
plinary authority significant misconduct of lawyers and other judges,
thus diminishing the number of instances in which judges take it on
themselves to impose sanctions for professional misconduct without
such reporting. Another reason for modifying the rule was to encourage
judges to take other remedial steps as appropriate, such as referring the
judge or lawyer whose conduct is in question to a bar-sponsored sub-
stance abuse treatment agency, without precluding judges from impos-
ing sanctions for professional misconduct. The revised rule was
designed to reflect the standards for reporting professional misconduct
that appear in Rule 8.3 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. The new rule also makes provision for judicial immunity in the
exercise of reporting professional misconduct, a concept recognized by
law. See Forrester v. White, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988) (absolute immunity
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for judicial acts, such as acting to disbar lawyer for contempt, but not
for administrative acts, such as firing court employee).
The Commentary then underlines the fact that "knowledge" is
defined as "actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." The proposed
Canon's combination of requirements-the state of mind must be
"actual knowledge" and the actual knowledge must be of "a violation"
of the rules, nothing less-makes it apparent that the language has
been carefully designed to exempt judges from any obligation to take
action in a great many instances of apparent wrongdoing by both
judges and lawyers. They simply will not "know" of "a violation."
Such a provision would make a mockery of the judicial claim to
authority over the behavior of judges and lawyers. It should not be
recommended by the ABA. If recommended, it should not be adopted
by the courts.
A concomitant feature of my suggestion that judges take seriously
the requirement of initiating disciplinary action against lawyers even if
they are not certain that a violation has occurred is that they treat the
lawyer fairly when they refer a matter to disciplinary authorities.
Judges ought to be careful that they not abuse their power. Public
criticism of a lawyer in an opinion in which the court does not under-
take the job of fact-finding with all the procedural safeguards involved
in a disciplinary proceeding may destroy or severely damage a law-
yer's reputation. When the lawyer has had no chance to defend, the
mere mention of the fact of reference to disciplinary authorities is
problematic, especially if accompanied by an unfavorable characteri-
zation of the lawyer's conduct.
A good example of such a situation is United States v. Ofshe.27 A
defendant in a federal proceeding in Florida claimed denial of due pro-
cess by reason of prosecutorial misconduct. The lawyer-author Scott
Turow,28 was then an Assistant United States Attorney in Illinois.
While he was investigating the defendant's attorney in connection with
"Operation Greylord" (a federal investigation of corruption in Cook
County, Illinois courts), the attorney offered to provide information in
relation to the drug trade. The result was that without informing the
prosecutors in Florida or the court, Mr. Turow arranged to "wire up"
the attorney to record conversations with the defendant although he
also instructed the attorney not to violate the attorney-client privilege.
27. 817 F.2d 1508 (1lth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1988).
28. Author of ONE L (1977) and PRESUMED INNOCENT (1987).
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Mr. Turow further instructed the attorney to withdraw from repre-
senting the defendant once surveillance was completed. No notice of
the monitoring was given to defendant. Indeed, the attorney did not
move to withdraw until ten months later, and even then, the with-
drawal was sealed so that defendant did not discover the reason for
nearly a year.
The trial court refused to order dismissal of the indictment and the
Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the defendant had not
demonstrated any prejudice. In a footnote to the published opinion,
the court said that, although the conduct of Mr. Turow and of defend-
ant's counsel was not "sufficiently outrageous" to require reversal of
the conviction, it was "repreiensible." The court therefore assumed
that the district judge would "refer this matter to The Attorney Regis-
tration and Disciplinary Commission, 203 N. Wabash, Suite 1900,
Chicago, Illinois 60601, for appropriate action. '2 9 The court did not
state why it was not, in view of this conclusion, imposing any disci-
pline itself. Perhaps it thought that procedural fairness necessary to
support the imposition of discipline required notice and an evidentiary
hearing whose focus would be the lawyer's conduct. Perhaps it
thought that a proceeding that had taken place in Florida and had
been reviewed in the Eleventh Circuit ought not to be the occasion for
discipline of a government lawyer who worked in Illinois and had
taken no part in the Florida proceeding, although defendant's counsel,
whose conduct also was criticized as reprehensible, had participated in
the proceeding.
After the opinion was filed, Mr. Turow moved to have the footnote
removed from the opinion. The court wrote a 13-page opinion, deny-
ing his motion.30 It concluded that since the defendant had argued
that his conviction should be reversed because the lawyers' conduct
had violated his constitutional right to due process, the review process
necessarily had focused on the lawyers' conduct. Going beyond its
earlier footnote, the court then concluded that Mr. Turow may well
have obstructed justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1503. It there-
fore ordered the clerk to forward its order to the United States Attor-
ney for the Southern District of Florida. Subsequently, a one-page
letter from the Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice
announced that there was no evidence that Mr. Turow or his superiors
29. 817 F.2d at 1516 n.6.
30. United States v. Ofshe (1Ith Cir. 1987) (No. 86-535 1) (unpublished).
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violated any federal statute.31 Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois Attorney Registration and Discipline Commission informed Mr.
Turow that it had voted to dismiss the investigation.32
The Court of Appeals was quite correct in taking so seriously its
duty to initiate disciplinary investigations of lawyers' conduct. The
issue is a subcategory of the larger question of the stage at which disci-
plinary authorities should make public the fact that disciplinary pro-
ceedings are pending against lawyers or judges. The difference here is
that the notice is from the court itself, a body that might, at least in
some cases, be taking further action after the disciplinary authorities
have acted.
In Ofshe, the notice given by the court had the beneficial effect of
sending an educational message to lawyers concerning the court's view
of the lawyer's conduct. It also had the beneficial effect of assuring the
public that the court was doing its duty with respect to required
reporting. Those are important considerations. On the other hand, it
clearly did serious injury to a lawyer's reputation in a proceeding in
which he never appeared as a party.
It is true that the court was required to focus on the lawyer's con-
duct in connection with the defendant's appeal and it is also probably
true that the major damage to the lawyer's reputation came from the
court's description and characterization of his conduct rather than
from its reference to the disciplinary authorities. It is nevertheless one
thing to reach a judgment about the lawyer's conduct for the purpose
of dealing with defendant's rights and quite another to link the lawyer
so publicly with charges of disciplinary violation when the court was
unwilling to undertake the task of disciplinary assessment itself.
The court could certainly have sent a sufficient message to lawyers
without the specific reference to possible discipline of this lawyer. The
further message regarding discipline would have come later if the dis-
ciplinary authorities had found that the lawyer had violated the disci-
plinary rules. When the state disciplinary authorities decided to
dismiss their investigation, however, there was no public notice of that
at all. The only item of record is the Court of Appeals' negative com-
ment. Thus, it seems that a court that has the power but is unwilling
to undertake the disciplinary process itself, either directly or through a
31. N.Y. Times, May 1, 1988, § 1, at 38, col. 1. Mr. Turow believes that the finding
constitutes a public "vindication." Turow, Law School v. Reality, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1988,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 52, col. 1.
32. Letter from Deborah M. Kennedy, Senior Counsel to the Commission, to Thomas P.




master (or other body appointed by it), should be very cautious about
the specific comments it makes about discipline.33
V. EXTRAJUDICIAL COMMENTARY
Another question that was put in a variety of ways relates to the
propriety of extrajudicial statements by judges on issues of general
public interest. As a formal matter, the Code of Conduct tries to walk
a fine line between, on the one hand, respecting the needs of judges to
exercise their own freedom of speech and (not to put too fine a point
on it) to earn additional money and, on the other hand, forbidding
judges from engaging in the kind of speech that may lead to reasonable
fears of partiality or, ultimately, to disqualification. Canon 4 of the
Code of Conduct reflects that tension when it tells judges that, so long
as they do not cast doubt on their capacity to decide any issue impar-
tially, they may write and teach about the law, may appear at public
hearings before legislative or executive bodies on matters concerning
the law or the administration of justice, may consult with such bodies
on the latter topic, and may serve on organizations devoted to the
improvement of the legal system.3a
I should interject here that I have been surprised (to use a mild
word) at the increasing numbers of articles and speeches by judges,
especially Supreme Court Justices, in the past 20 years in which they
discuss all sorts of issues that seem likely to come before them and
discuss also the views and foibles of their colleagues. There is a differ-
ence between exhibiting greater willingness to discuss the business of
courts by way of educating the public and engaging in public argu-
ment for positions they hold dear. I said above that there is a relation
between the perceived power of judges and public scrutiny of the pro-
priety of their activities. There also would seem to be a relation
between the willingness of judges to enter into the public fray and the
increasing tendency of some academics and some media figures to
equate judges with legislators.
The Judicial Conference's Committee on Codes of Conduct has
addressed the general permission given by Canon 4 to appear before
legislative and executive hearings on matters concerning the law by
33. Cf Beiny v. Wynyard, 132 A.D.2d 190, 522 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1987), where the court gave
public notice of the referral to disciplinary authorities not only of the law firm's conduct in
improperly obtaining confidential information but also of the allegation in a newspaper report
that a member of the law firm had assaulted another attorney in the Surrogate's Court at a
conference in the proceeding.
34. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 4. The ABA Discussion Draft
reflects the same tension in almost identical words in Canon 4A(1), 4B, and 4C(1).
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reading that permission narrowly to include only situations where the
matter deserves the comment of a judge in his or her professional
capacity.35 Its explanation is that legislation involving important
political and social issues may well spawn litigation likely to come
before the judge. That explanation implies that a judge who has urged
the legislature or executive to follow a particular course of action with
respect to a particular issue has cast doubt on his or her ability to
decide impartially a case involving such an issue. If that is the case,
why does the same problem not exist when a judge makes a speech on
the same subject matter although not in a legislative or judicial forum?
There is enormous tension between enforcing the ideal of impartial-
ity and disabling judges from effective judicial service. Many judges
have taken positions before appointment, either in their capacity as
advocates or as citizens, on the general subject matter that will come
before them. Those positions were taken without the institutional
responsibility that comes with being a judge. Moreover, the judiciary
could not function if such prior expressions were a basis for disqualifi-
cation. Likewise, many judges who have sat on the bench long enough
have well established positions on certain issues. When a similar issue
arises, a party might reasonably believe such a judge will not approach
the issue with the perfect disinterestedness of one considering the issue
de novo. But we do not expect that kind of disinterestedness in our
judges. Indeed, we expect them to develop identifiable positions as a
result of their judicial service. On the other hand, Canon 4 would
seem clearly to prohibit judges from publicly announcing their views
about cases pending before them.
Canon 4 therefore requires the exercise of prudential judgment in
interpreting its injunction against engaging in such outside activities
that might cause a litigant or the public reasonably to question the
judge's impartiality. It certainly is not the development of views on
matters that might come before judges that we fear. We want our
judges to read, to think, to educate themselves about law in the largest
sense. But there is a difference between a private thought and a public
speech or published article. Going public requires much more care
and responsibility and also may indicate such a desire to persuade
others as to bring it within the range of Canon 4's prohibition of
speech that casts doubt on the impartiality of the judge.
An early opinion of the federal Advisory Committee resolved the
tension inherent in the language and policies of Canon 4 by stating




that a judge should "circumscribe his comments so as to avoid a posi-
tive commitment on any legal issue which is likely to arise before
him."3 6 More recently, however, the Committee has quoted with
approval the statement in the Reporter's Notes to the ABA's Code of
Judicial Conduct that a "judge may write or lecture on a legal issue,
analyzing the present law and its history, its virtues, and its shortcom-
ings; he may commend the present law or propose legal reform with-
out compromising his capacity to decide impartially the very issue in
which he has spoken or written."37
The Reporter's statement is far too broad, for many such reform
proposals may well cast doubt on a judge's impartiality. There is not
always such a clear line between expressing willingness to follow pres-
ent law and urging legislative change in the law. If present law is
unclear, an expression of a desirable legislative solution may well
appear to signal the judge's view of the desirable judicial solution.
Moreover if, as the Committee suggested, a judge ought not urge legis-
lative passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, or, to take another
example, if a judge ought not appear before a legislature to urge repeal
of capital punishment, then it should not be permissible for a judge to
write an article or to give a public talk on the deficiencies of our law
with respect to capital punishment. The judge will have sufficient
opportunity to express a view when the issue arises, appropriately
argued, in a litigated matter. The reasonable public fear regarding the
judge's impartiality in reviewing a capital sentence seems equivalent
whether the judge appears before a committee or produces a speech or
article because in those two situations both the testimony before the
committee and the speech or article bespeak a significant commitment
to oppose capital punishment.38
36. Interim Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities Advisory Op. 3 (1970).
37. Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities Advisory Op. 55 (1977) (quoting E. THODE,
REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 74 (1973)).
38. A closely divided Florida Supreme Court concluded that although a trial judge had come
close to the line in writing an article for a church newsletter opposing capital punishment, he had
saved himself by making clear that "he would do his duty as a judge and follow the law as
written." In re Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950, 955 (Fla. 1982). Cf In re Mandeville, 144 Vt. 608, 481
A.2d 1048, 1049 (1984) (imposing discipline on a trial judge who stated in a public interview that
defendants who pleaded guilty would be treated more leniently than those who went to trial).
See generally Lubet, Judicial Ethics and Private Lives, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 983, 996 (1985).
Since this lecture was delivered, the subject of extrajudicial speech has been canvassed
extensively in Ross, Extrajudicial Speech: Charting the Boundaries of Propriety, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 589 (1989). Professor Ross expresses a number of the same reservations about
extrajudicial speech as are contained in the present article. A response by Professor Lubet argues
against an expansive notion of extrajudicial silence. Lubet, supra note 5.
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The failure of the Advisory Committee to repeat the Canon's caveat
in its most recent opinion may be due to a fear that an expansive read-
ing of the prohibition would make it difficult for judges to engage in
law school teaching, a practice sanctioned by long history and by vir-
tual economic necessity for some judges if they are to remain on the
bench. But one quality teaching may have is that it is exploratory,
tentative, informal, and impermanent. Such teaching is different from
the typical public speech or article. On the other hand, teaching may
be just as authoritative as a speech or article. Such teaching carries
the same danger of compromising the appearance of impartiality. If I
had to engage in prudential line drawing, I would interpret the Canon
as permitting the former, but not the latter, style of teaching. While
that may be "too nice" a distinction, the language of Canon 4 seems to
contemplate just that kind of fine line drawing.
Thus, if I had to choose between the phrasing of Advisory Opinion
No. 3 and that of Advisory Opinion No. 55, I would choose the for-
mer, more restrictive statement. One reason for that choice is that,
except for egregious conduct, judges enjoy what lawyers often say they
themselves enjoy but which lawyers really have less and less these
days-a self-regulating profession. The critical thing about such a sta-
tus is that it is regarded quite jealously by those who do not enjoy it.
If judges are perceived as abusing that status, it will come under fire
and they may lose it.
The second reason for my restrictive attitude toward public speech
by judges is that, notwithstanding the policymaking function of the
judiciary, there is still a big difference between judges and legislators.
Reflecting that difference, our tradition has been that most judges,
most of the time, have waited for cases to present issues to them before
speaking out. I hope that today's judges will pause before undertaking
extrajudicial activities that narrow that difference. If the differences
between judges and legislators are eliminated one by one, we may
some day find that we have eroded the essential nature of the separa-
tion of powers between our legislative and judicial branches that has
been such a distinctive feature of our society.39
39. I have spelled out my views on this subject in Kaufman, Judges or Scholars: To Whom
Shall We Look for our Constitutional Law?, 37 J. LEG. ED. 184 (1987).
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